The Power of Legislative Leaders

57 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2015 Last revised: 24 Nov 2015

See all articles by Alexander Fouirnaies

Alexander Fouirnaies

Harris School at University of Chicago

Andrew Hall

Stanford University

Date Written: November 16, 2015

Abstract

Foundational theories of the legislature disagree about why, or even whether, legislative leaders are powerful, but issues of measurement and causal inference have prevented empirical work from addressing these debates effectively. To make progress, we offer a new dataset on the identities of legislative leaders in all U.S. state legislatures over the past 20 years. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show that, on average, becoming a majority-party leader causes a large increase in contributions from strategic interest groups — an indication that leaders are indeed powerful. Contrary to major theoretical predictions, however, we show that leaders are no more powerful, and possibly less powerful, when legislative polarization increases. Moreover, neither the size of the majority party nor the professionalization of the legislature are associated with how powerful majority-party leaders are. In contrast, we find that majority- party leaders are more powerful in bigger legislatures, which we argue suggests that a key role for leaders is solving issues of complexity and coordination. The paper thus offers new data and evidence that revises and improves our understanding of legislative politics both in the U.S. and in democratic settings more generally.

Suggested Citation

Fouirnaies, Alexander and Hall, Andrew, The Power of Legislative Leaders (November 16, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2653063 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2653063

Alexander Fouirnaies

Harris School at University of Chicago ( email )

Harris School of Public Policy
1155 E 60th St
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
+17732942341 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.fouirnaies.com

Andrew Hall (Contact Author)

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
74
Abstract Views
942
rank
319,598
PlumX Metrics