Upward Price Pressure, Merger Simulation, and Merger Simulation Light

8 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2015

Date Written: March 2, 2011

Abstract

The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have traditionally used market shares as an early preliminary screen in evaluating the potential for anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger. Recently, Farrell and Shapiro proposed a new merger screen known as Upward Price Pressure. This article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of this screen, contrasts it to more complicated full merger simulations, and ultimately suggests a merger simulation light approach that has elements of both and that may be more useful in the very early stages of analysis.

Suggested Citation

Noel, Michael D., Upward Price Pressure, Merger Simulation, and Merger Simulation Light (March 2, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2653096 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2653096

Michael D. Noel (Contact Author)

Texas Tech University ( email )

237 Holden Hall
Box 41014
Lubbock, TX 79407
United States

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