Antidumping and Strategic Industrial Policy: Tit-for-Tat Trade Remedies and the China-X-Ray Equipment Dispute

48 Pages Posted: 1 Sep 2015

See all articles by Michael Moore

Michael Moore

George Washington University - Department of Economics

Mark Wu

Harvard Law School

Date Written: August 2015

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between antidumping duties and strategic industrial policy. We argue that the dynamic between the two instruments is more complex and elaborate than that offered by the conventional account. We use the recent China-X-Ray Equipment dispute as a case study to show that linkage between the two instruments may not be the consequence of a government-led policy but instead a result of firm-driven responses to an industrial policy. This in turn may lead to antidumping tit-for-tat behavior between WTO members. We also analyze how WTO litigation serves as a means to alter the payoff and discuss the implications and unresolved questions that remain following the China-X-Ray Equipment ruling by the WTO.

Keywords: Antidumping, industrial policy, WTO, dispute settlement

Suggested Citation

Moore, Michael O. and Wu, Mark, Antidumping and Strategic Industrial Policy: Tit-for-Tat Trade Remedies and the China-X-Ray Equipment Dispute (August 2015). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2015/51, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2653659 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2653659

Michael O. Moore (Contact Author)

George Washington University - Department of Economics ( email )

Monroe Hall, Suite 340
2115 G Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
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202-370-1806 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://home.gwu.edu/~mom

Mark Wu

Harvard Law School ( email )

Griswold Hall Room 302
1525 Massachusetts Ave.
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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