Analyst Bias and Mispricing

53 Pages Posted: 2 Sep 2015 Last revised: 29 Mar 2023

See all articles by Mark Grinblatt

Mark Grinblatt

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area; Yale University - International Center for Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Gergana Jostova

George Washington University - Department of Finance

Alexander Philipov

George Mason University - Department of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 27, 2023

Abstract

Cross-sectional forecasts of conservative and optimistic biases in analyst earnings estimates predict a stock's future returns, especially for firms that are hard to value. Trading strategies—whether based on the component of analyst bias that is correlated with major return anomalies or the component that is orthogonal to these anomalies—earn abnormal profits. The prevalence of optimistic analyst earnings estimates and rarity of conservative estimates emerges as a common link between anomaly-generating firm characteristics and subsequent negative alphas. For the vast majority of anomaly strategies, profitability disappears once we control for analyst bias.

Keywords: Analyst bias, credit risk, anomalies, market efficiency, behavioral

JEL Classification: G14, G11, G12, G02

Suggested Citation

Grinblatt, Mark and Jostova, Gergana and Philipov, Alexander, Analyst Bias and Mispricing (March 27, 2023). 7th Miami Behavioral Finance Conference 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2653666 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2653666

Mark Grinblatt

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-1098 (Phone)
310-206-5455 (Fax)

Yale University - International Center for Finance

Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Gergana Jostova (Contact Author)

George Washington University - Department of Finance ( email )

2201 G St NW
Funger Hall, Suite 501
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-7478 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://business.gwu.edu/gergana-jostova

Alexander Philipov

George Mason University - Department of Finance ( email )

Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~aphilipo

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