Fund Structure, Investor Protection, and the Long-Run Performance of Activism

51 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 2015 Last revised: 20 Nov 2015

See all articles by Namho Kang

Namho Kang

University of Connecticut

Gideon Ozik

EDHEC Business School

Ronnie Sadka

Boston College - Carroll School of Management

Date Written: November 1, 2015

Abstract

This paper investigate the effects of investor protection on hedge fund activism. Using a parsimonious measure of investor protection constructed from fund organizational characteristics, we document that higher investor protection is strongly correlated with superior performance of activists. Companies targeted by activists with better investor protection provides roughly 22% higher return per year than those targeted by activists with poor protection. Outperformance of target firms is also measured in return-on-assets and valuation ratios. The effect is neither explained by superior target selection ability nor by takeover activity, but rather by increased operational efficiency and reduced the agency costs of the target firms. The paper’s findings are consistent with the extant literature that a better investor protection encourages efficient investment through promoting higher valuation and reducing agency costs.

Keywords: Activism, Hedge Fund, Investor Protection

JEL Classification: G2, G3

Suggested Citation

Kang, Namho and Ozik, Gideon and Sadka, Ronnie, Fund Structure, Investor Protection, and the Long-Run Performance of Activism (November 1, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2654825 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2654825

Namho Kang (Contact Author)

University of Connecticut ( email )

Storrs, CT 06269-1063
United States

Gideon Ozik

EDHEC Business School ( email )

Nice
France

Ronnie Sadka

Boston College - Carroll School of Management ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

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