The Rise of Domestic Outsourcing and the Evolution of the German Wage Structure

55 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 2015

See all articles by Deborah Goldschmidt

Deborah Goldschmidt

Boston University

Johannes F. Schmieder

Boston University - Department of Economics; IZA; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Abstract

The nature of the relationship between employers and employees has been changing over the last decades, with firms increasingly relying on contractors, temp agencies and franchises rather than hiring employees directly. We investigate the impact of this transformation on the wage structure by following jobs that are moved outside of the boundary of lead employers to contracting firms. For this end we develop a new method for identifying outsourcing of food, cleaning, security and logistics services in administrative data using the universe of social security records in Germany. We document a dramatic growth of domestic outsourcing in Germany since the early 1990s. Event-study analyses show that wages in outsourced jobs fall by approximately 10-15% relative to similar jobs that are not outsourced.We find evidence that the wage losses associated with outsourcing stem from a loss of firm-specific rents, suggesting that labor cost savings are an important reason why firms choose to contract out these services. Finally, we tie the increase in outsourcing activity to broader changes in the German wage structure, in particular showing that outsourcing of cleaning, security and logistics services alone accounts for around 10 percent of the increase in German wage inequality since the 1980s.

Keywords: inequality, wage structure, contracting-out, outsourcing, wage premia

JEL Classification: J31, D22

Suggested Citation

Goldschmidt, Deborah and Schmieder, Johannes F., The Rise of Domestic Outsourcing and the Evolution of the German Wage Structure. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9194, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2655143 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2655143

Deborah Goldschmidt (Contact Author)

Boston University ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

Johannes F. Schmieder

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
United States

IZA ( email )

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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