Conditional Cooperation and Betrayal Aversion

36 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 2015

See all articles by Robin P. Cubitt

Robin P. Cubitt

University of Nottingham; University of Nottingham - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)

Simon Gaechter

University of Nottingham; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Simone Quercia

University of Bonn

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods game to classify subjects by type of contribution preference and by belief about the contributions of others; and we measure betrayal aversion for different categories of subject. We find that, among conditional cooperators, only those who expect others to contribute little to the public good are significantly betrayal averse, while there is no evidence of betrayal aversion for those who expect substantial contributions by others. This is consistent with their social risk taking in public goods games, as the pessimistic conditional cooperators tend to avoid contribution to avoid exploitation, whereas the optimistic ones typically contribute to the public good and thus take the social risk of being exploited.

Keywords: exploitation aversion, betrayal aversion, trust, conditional cooperation, public goods game, free riding, experiments

JEL Classification: H41, C91, C72, D03

Suggested Citation

Cubitt, Robin P. and Gachter, Simon and Quercia, Simone, Conditional Cooperation and Betrayal Aversion. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9241, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2655282

Robin P. Cubitt (Contact Author)

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www/economics/staff/details/robin_cubitt.htm

University of Nottingham - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

Simon Gachter

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Simone Quercia

University of Bonn ( email )

Institute for Applied Microeconomics
Adenauerallee 24 - 42
Bonn, 53113
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
17
Abstract Views
326
PlumX Metrics