On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation

Posted: 5 Apr 2001

See all articles by Patrick W. Schmitz

Patrick W. Schmitz

University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Abstract

The efficiency of two different means of controlling hazardous economic activities, namely ex post liability for harm done and ex ante safety regulation, is re-examined. Some researchers have stressed that the complementary use of these two instruments can be socially advantageous. Here it is argued that the models which have been built in order to support this view crucially depend on the assumption that there are persistent enforcement errors. It is demonstrated that such a rather unsatisfactory assumption is not needed if wealth varies among injurers.

Suggested Citation

Schmitz, Patrick W., On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 371-382, 2000 and Vol. 20, No. 4, P. 575, 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=265719

Patrick W. Schmitz (Contact Author)

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://schmitz.uni-koeln.de/index.php?s=mitarbeiter&t=schmitz

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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