When Kamay Met Hill: Organization Ethics in Practice

35 Pages Posted: 8 Sep 2015 Last revised: 12 Jan 2017

See all articles by Jonathan A. Batten

Jonathan A. Batten

RMIT University

Igor Loncarski

University of Ljubljana - Faculty of Economics

Peter G. Szilagyi

Central European University

Date Written: October 30, 2016


The Kamay and Hill insider trading conviction in Australia highlights many of the issues and problems involved in the prevention, detection and prosecution of insider trading. The case uniquely highlights how ethical behaviour is instilled at home, in school and in society, and the need for ethical responsibility at the personal and organizational level to complement legal rules and enforcement. We use the Kamay and Hill case to explore the reasons behind the failure of the traditional top-down approach to insider trading prevention, where institutional ethical codes of conduct largely reflect and rely upon national rules, norms, and regulation. We propose a bottom-up approach to ensure that individual and organizational behaviour is ethical, where emphasis is not on compliance but on a set of core ethical values that allow individual and corporate expression. It is our strong belief that compliance cannot replace ethics.

Keywords: Abuse of public office; Australia; Ethical norms and values; Ethical standards and codes; Industry standards; Foreign exchange market; FX Global Code; Insider trading; UN Global Compact

JEL Classification: A29, G19, G29, G30, M14, O56

Suggested Citation

Batten, Jonathan A. and Lončarski, Igor and Szilagyi, Peter G., When Kamay Met Hill: Organization Ethics in Practice (October 30, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2657361 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2657361

Jonathan A. Batten (Contact Author)

RMIT University ( email )

Level 12, 239 Bourke Street
Melbourne, Victoria

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.rmit.edu.au/contact/staff-contacts/academic-staff/b/batten-professor-jonathan

Igor Lončarski

University of Ljubljana - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Kardeljeva ploscad 17
Ljubljana, SI-1000
+386 5892 628 (Phone)
+386 5892 698 (Fax)

Peter G. Szilagyi

Central European University ( email )

Nador utca 9.
Budapest, 1051
+36-1-887-5092 (Phone)
+36-1-887-5005 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.ceu.edu/peter_szilagyi

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