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The More It Changes, the More It Stays the Same?: Automatic Indexing and Current Policy

in Fagan and Levmore Eds.), THE TIMING OF LEGAL INTERVENTION (Edward Elgar Publishing), Forthcoming

NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 15-44

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 15-18

32 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2015 Last revised: 4 Nov 2015

Daniel Shaviro

New York University School of Law

Date Written: July 15, 2015

Abstract

This projected chapter addresses issues associated with automatically indexing fiscal policies, such as those in the U.S. income tax and Social Security systems. Under indexing, a statistical measure - pertaining, for example, to inflation, wage levels, life expectancy, or income inequality - is used to determine changes to nominal legal rules that then take effect automatically. One possible reason for favoring automatic indexing is that it may keep the underlying policy, by some metric, "the same" as empirical circumstances change. While indexing often makes sense, from the standpoint of a policymaker whose long-term preferences it would keep in place barring further legislative action, identifying the set of "current policies" that one might want to perpetuate (or change) can be surprisingly difficult. The paper explores broader conceptual issues pertaining to policy continuity and competing objectives when legislation remains on the books indefinitely, with particular reference to examples drawn from the history of the U.S. income tax and Social Security.

Keywords: automatic indexing, inflation indexing, long-term budget policy, timing of legal intervention, policy change, tax reform, Social Security reform

JEL Classification: H20, H24, H50, H55, H60, H61, H62, K34

Suggested Citation

Shaviro, Daniel, The More It Changes, the More It Stays the Same?: Automatic Indexing and Current Policy (July 15, 2015). in Fagan and Levmore Eds.), THE TIMING OF LEGAL INTERVENTION (Edward Elgar Publishing), Forthcoming; NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 15-44; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 15-18. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2657602

Daniel Shaviro (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
Room 314-B
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6187 (Phone)
212-995-4341 (Fax)

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