Insider Trading and the Legal Expertise of Corporate Executives
Journal of Banking and Finance, forthcoming
61 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2015 Last revised: 15 Mar 2021
Date Written: August 12, 2017
Abstract
We investigate if prior professional legal education either restrains or increases the extent to which the insider trades of company executives and directors are informed. We show that executives and directors with legal expertise (lawyer-insiders) earn significantly lower abnormal returns than non-lawyer-insiders when they purchase their own company’s shares. Purchases by lawyer-insiders are associated with lower future earnings surprises and firm profitability than those made by non-lawyer-insiders, and are more muted following months with high levels of SEC enforcement activity. Our results suggest that insiders with legal education may be more conservative in exploiting private information when making insider trades.
Keywords: Insider trading, legal expertise, law degree, asset prices, private information
JEL Classification: G14, G30, G38, K20
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation