Incentives for Voluntary Disclosure
Posted: 18 May 2001
Rule l0b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act allows investors to sue firms for misrepresentation or omission. Since firms are principal-agent contracts between owners - contract designers - and privately informed managers, owners are the ultimate firms' voluntary disclosure strategists. We analyze voluntary disclosure equilibrium in a game with two types of owners: expected liquidating dividends motivated (VMO) and expected price motivated (PMO). We find that Rule l0b-5: (i) does not deter misrepresentation and may suppress voluntary disclosure or, (ii) induces some firms to adopt a partial disclosure policy of disclosing only bad news or only good news.
Keywords: Rule l0b-5, Disclosure, Noisy rational expectations equilibrium, Principal-agent contracts, Incentives
JEL Classification: G10, G30, K22, D82, M41, M45
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation