Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2660413
 


 



When Anomalies Are Publicized Broadly, Do Institutions Trade Accordingly?


Paul Calluzzo


Queen's University - Smith School of Business

Fabio Moneta


Queen's University - Smith School of Business

Selim Topaloglu


Queen's University - Smith School of Business

December 1, 2016


Abstract:     
We study whether institutional investors trade on stock market anomalies. Using 14 well-documented anomalies, we observe an increase in anomaly-based trading when information about the anomalies is readily available through academic publication and the release of necessary accounting data. This finding is more pronounced among hedge funds and transient institutions, the subset of investors who likely have the ability and incentives to act on the anomalies. We directly relate the increase in trading to the observed decay in post-publication anomaly returns. Our findings support the role of institutional investors in the arbitrage process and in improving market efficiency.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 63

Keywords: Anomalies, publication impact, arbitrage, institutions, hedge funds

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G23


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Date posted: September 15, 2015 ; Last revised: December 14, 2016

Suggested Citation

Calluzzo, Paul and Moneta, Fabio and Topaloglu, Selim, When Anomalies Are Publicized Broadly, Do Institutions Trade Accordingly? (December 1, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2660413 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2660413

Contact Information

Paul Calluzzo
Queen's University - Smith School of Business ( email )
Queen's University
143 Union Street
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada

Fabio Moneta (Contact Author)
Queen's University - Smith School of Business ( email )
Queen's University
143 Union Street
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada

Selim Topaloglu
Queen's University - Smith School of Business ( email )
437 Goodes Hall
143 Union St.
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada
613-533-6573 (Phone)
613-533-2321 (Fax)

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