Economic Theory of Non-Territorial Unbundling

45 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2015

See all articles by Trent MacDonald

Trent MacDonald

RMIT University, Faculty of Business, School of Economics, Finance and Marketing, Students

Date Written: November 1, 2013

Abstract

We introduce the case for non-territorial unbundling by taking a discursive approach through public choice and evolutionary economic theory. The argument begins with an appreciation of the many paradoxes and problems of majoritarian voting and proceeds to explore the theory of non-territorial and unbundled governance as means to improve political choice. I find that decoupling political jurisdiction from geographical location (so that citizens can switch political jurisdictions without switching location) and unbundling government (so that collective goods and services can be provided separately by independent public enterprises) will result in greater diversity of governmental forms, a wider range of choice for groups and individuals, and ultimately, better governance. Moreover, I contend that not all bundling should be ruled out; rather, the point is to create an ‘unbundleable’ system of governance and allow political entrepreneurs to discover ways to rebundle functions. Experimentation with bundling, unbundling, and rebundling of the various services states offer elicits the discovery of optimal bundling options for the diversity of citizen preferences.

Keywords: Non-territorial, unbundling, public goods, club theory, political choice

JEL Classification: H00, H11, P43, D00, B52

Suggested Citation

MacDonald, Trent, Economic Theory of Non-Territorial Unbundling (November 1, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2661228 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2661228

Trent MacDonald (Contact Author)

RMIT University, Faculty of Business, School of Economics, Finance and Marketing, Students ( email )

Level 12, 239 Bourke Street
Melbourne, Victoria
Australia

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