Why Do Institutions Delay Reporting Their Shareholdings? Evidence from Form 13F

57 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2015 Last revised: 7 Jul 2016

See all articles by Susan Kerr Christoffersen

Susan Kerr Christoffersen

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; Copenhagen Business School

Erfan Danesh

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

David K. Musto

University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department

Date Written: August 15, 2015

Abstract

Institutional investors are allowed to delay their disclosures of quarter-end holdings via form 13F for up to 45 days. This forbearance may help protect the institutions from potentially damaging behavior by other traders, in particular from free-riding copycatters and from front-runners. It also may help the institutions hide their voting power, and this has prompted public corporations to request a much shorter maximum reporting lag. We look at 14 years of 13F filings to gauge the role of these three motives in the decision to delay disclosure, and the results indicate that front-running and voting, but not copycatting, motivate delays.

Keywords: SEC, Reporting Requirements, 13F Filings

JEL Classification: G18, G20, G38

Suggested Citation

Christoffersen, Susan E. and Danesh, Erfan and Musto, David K., Why Do Institutions Delay Reporting Their Shareholdings? Evidence from Form 13F (August 15, 2015). Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 2661535, 27th Annual Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2661535 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2661535

Susan E. Christoffersen (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada
416 946 5647 (Phone)
416 971 3048 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/schristoffersen

Copenhagen Business School

Solbjerg Plads 3
Frederiksberg C, DK - 2000
Denmark

Erfan Danesh

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States
1-202-280-4197 (Phone)

David K. Musto

University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )

The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
514
Abstract Views
3,082
Rank
98,947
PlumX Metrics