Collective Enforcement of Consumer Rights in the United Kingdom

Money-Kyrle R 'Collective Enforcement of Consumer Rights in the United Kingdom' in 'Im Namen des Verbrauchers? Kollective Rechtsdurchsetzung in Europa/In the Name of Consumers? Collective Rights Enforcement in Europe', Schmidt-Kessel M, Strünck C and Kramme M (eds), JVW Publishing, 2015.

39 Pages Posted: 22 Sep 2015

See all articles by Rebecca (Money-Kyrle) Mooney

Rebecca (Money-Kyrle) Mooney

Centre for Socio Legal Studies, University of Oxford

Date Written: March 01, 2015

Abstract

This chapter arose out of a conference convened at Bayreuth University in 2014, to consider collective and public interest enforcement of consumer rights in Europe. This chapter evaluates procedural mechanisms for collective enforcement of consumer rights in the United Kingdom, including scrutiny of generic public and private law mechanisms, and regulatory redress schemes. Vertical comparisons are made with the European Union Recommendation on Collective Redress, and in context of the wider objectives of the publication to draw horizontal comparisons with other European jurisdictions.

Keywords: public interest; litigation; collective claims; collective action; collective redress; consumer rights; compensation; damages; European Union law; United Kingdom;

Suggested Citation

Money-Kyrle, Rebecca, Collective Enforcement of Consumer Rights in the United Kingdom (March 01, 2015). Money-Kyrle R 'Collective Enforcement of Consumer Rights in the United Kingdom' in 'Im Namen des Verbrauchers? Kollective Rechtsdurchsetzung in Europa/In the Name of Consumers? Collective Rights Enforcement in Europe', Schmidt-Kessel M, Strünck C and Kramme M (eds), JVW Publishing, 2015., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2661980

Rebecca Money-Kyrle (Contact Author)

Centre for Socio Legal Studies, University of Oxford ( email )

Mansfield Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 4AU
United Kingdom

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