Social Norms and Legal Design

CIRPEE Working paper 15-20

52 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2015

See all articles by Bruno Deffains

Bruno Deffains

Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas; Institut Universitaire de France

Claude Fluet

Université Laval

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 21, 2015

Abstract

We compare fault-based and strict liability offences in law enforcement when behavior is influenced by informal prosocial norms of conduct. Fault tends to be more effective than strict liability in harnessing social or self-image concerns. When enforcement relies on fines and assessing fault is not too costly, the optimal legal regime is fault-based with a standard consistent with the underlying social norm if convictions would seldom occur under optimal enforcement; otherwise liability should be strict. When sanctions are nonmonetary or when stigmatization imposes a deadweight loss, the legal standard may be harsher or more lenient than the social norm.

Keywords: Social preferences, regulatory offences, law enforcement, strict liability, fault, legal standard, compliance, deterrence

JEL Classification: D8, K4, Z13

Suggested Citation

Deffains, Bruno and Fluet, Claude-Denys, Social Norms and Legal Design (September 21, 2015). CIRPEE Working paper 15-20, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2663612 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2663612

Bruno Deffains

Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas ( email )

12 place du Pantheon
Paris cedex 05, 75005
France

Institut Universitaire de France ( email )

103, bld Saint-Michel
75005 Paris
France

Claude-Denys Fluet (Contact Author)

Université Laval ( email )

2214 Pavillon J-A. DeSeve
Quebec, Quebec G1K 7P4
Canada
1-418-656-2131, ext 3290 (Phone)

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