The Problem of Many Hands in International Law

"The Political Economy of International Law: A European Perspective" Editor: Alberta Fabbricotti, (Elgar Publishers 2016), Forthcoming

Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2015-35

Amsterdam Center for International Law No. 2015-15

29 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2015

See all articles by Andre Nollkaemper

Andre Nollkaemper

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for International Law

Date Written: September 22, 2015

Abstract

This paper examines the phenomenon of diffusion of responsibility from a political economy perspective. It argues that concerted actions that lead to harmful outcomes may trigger a diffusion of responsibility between States, international organisations (IOs) and other actors involved in the concerted action. Such diffusion may bring both costs and benefits for relevant actors. The chapter construes diffusion as a political process, of which international law is an integral part, and exposes the costs and benefits involved.

Keywords: Responsibility, international organizations, diffusion, remedies, delegation, orchestration

JEL Classification: K33

Suggested Citation

Nollkaemper, Andre, The Problem of Many Hands in International Law (September 22, 2015). "The Political Economy of International Law: A European Perspective" Editor: Alberta Fabbricotti, (Elgar Publishers 2016), Forthcoming ; Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2015-35; Amsterdam Center for International Law No. 2015-15. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2664031

Andre Nollkaemper (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for International Law ( email )

P.O. Box 1030
Amsterdam, 1000 BA
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://home.medewerker.uva.nl/p.a.nollkaemper/

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