Authorities, Reasons, and Choice

Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, Vol. 40, pp. 205-211, 2015

Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 15/88

13 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2015 Last revised: 25 Jul 2016

See all articles by Michael Sevel

Michael Sevel

The University of Sydney Law School

Date Written: September 23, 2015

Abstract

This is a critical discussion of Nicole Roughan's Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation, and Transnational Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 2013). One of the primary targets of the book is Joseph Raz's service conception of authority, particularly in how it deals with cases of plural authority. I argue that Roughan's criticisms fail, and Raz's view ultimately accounts for many of Roughan's examples of conflicts generated by claims of multiple authorities by way of a comprehensive moral theory, rather than narrowly within a theory of practical authority. While Roughan does not give us compelling reason to take an approach different from Raz's, her book is nonetheless a substantive and innovative contribution to moral, legal, and constitutional theory.

Keywords: Jurisprudence, Joseph Raz, authority, legal pluralism, legitimacy

JEL Classification: K10, K30

Suggested Citation

Sevel, Michael, Authorities, Reasons, and Choice (September 23, 2015). Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, Vol. 40, pp. 205-211, 2015, Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 15/88, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2664889

Michael Sevel (Contact Author)

The University of Sydney Law School ( email )

New Law Building, F10
The University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia

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