Authorities, Reasons, and Choice
Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, Vol. 40, pp. 205-211, 2015
13 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2015 Last revised: 25 Jul 2016
Date Written: September 23, 2015
This is a critical discussion of Nicole Roughan's Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation, and Transnational Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 2013). One of the primary targets of the book is Joseph Raz's service conception of authority, particularly in how it deals with cases of plural authority. I argue that Roughan's criticisms fail, and Raz's view ultimately accounts for many of Roughan's examples of conflicts generated by claims of multiple authorities by way of a comprehensive moral theory, rather than narrowly within a theory of practical authority. While Roughan does not give us compelling reason to take an approach different from Raz's, her book is nonetheless a substantive and innovative contribution to moral, legal, and constitutional theory.
Keywords: Jurisprudence, Joseph Raz, authority, legal pluralism, legitimacy
JEL Classification: K10, K30
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation