Inside the Black Box: Collegial Patterns on Investment Tribunals

Todd Tucker, "Inside the Black Box: Collegial Patterns on Investment Tribunals", J Int. Disp. Settlement (2016) 7:1, 183-204.

22 Pages Posted: 30 Sep 2015 Last revised: 2 Apr 2016

Date Written: September 17, 2015

Abstract

This article examines the collegial dynamics within investment tribunals. I construct a qualitative typology of adjudicator-level interactions based on original interviews with arbitrators from over 90% of finalized investment arbitrations. I proceed in several steps. First, I present an empirical and theoretical background on investment arbitration governance. Second, I give an overview of my data collection and method. I then present eight ideal types of arbitrators, which vary by their tilt towards states and affinity for each other. I then consider 128 distinct tribunal combinations, for which I explore the implications for states. I conclude that collegial dynamics contribute to making awards more investor-friendly or fact specific. The article contributes to the judicial politics and judicialization literatures by providing a case study of collegial dynamics among a class of adjudicators that lack tenure.

Keywords: judicialization, investment treaties, arbitrator

JEL Classification: N40, O19, F21, K33

Suggested Citation

Tucker, Todd, Inside the Black Box: Collegial Patterns on Investment Tribunals (September 17, 2015). Todd Tucker, "Inside the Black Box: Collegial Patterns on Investment Tribunals", J Int. Disp. Settlement (2016) 7:1, 183-204. . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2666598 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2666598

Todd Tucker (Contact Author)

Roosevelt Institute ( email )

4079 Albany Post Rd.
Hyde Park, NY 12538
United States

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