The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights

9 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2001

See all articles by Patrick W. Schmitz

Patrick W. Schmitz

University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Abstract

Using a simple bilateral trading example with discrete valuations and costs (based on Matsuo, Journal of Economic Theory, 1989), this note demonstrates that in the presence of private information the efficiency of Coasean bargaining may in some situations be strictly enhanced if initially no property rights are assigned.

Keywords: Property rights, Bargaining, Private information, Coase theorem

JEL Classification: K11, D82

Suggested Citation

Schmitz, Patrick W., The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights. European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=266684 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.266684

Patrick W. Schmitz (Contact Author)

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://schmitz.uni-koeln.de/index.php?s=mitarbeiter&t=schmitz

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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