Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance

9 Pages Posted: 30 Sep 2015 Last revised: 7 Jan 2017

See all articles by Anastasios Dosis

Anastasios Dosis

ESSEC Business School; University of Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA

Date Written: December 16, 2016

Abstract

I formalise a rather stylised insurance market with adverse selection as a standard duopoly. I formally specify demand functions and profits and I prove that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists if and only if the well-known Rothschild-Stiglitz allocation is efficient.

Keywords: Insurance, Adverse Selection, Duopoly, Contracts, Nash Equilibrium

JEL Classification: C62, C72, D86, L13

Suggested Citation

Dosis, Anastasios, Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance (December 16, 2016). Economics Letters, Vol. 152, 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2666967 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2666967

Anastasios Dosis (Contact Author)

ESSEC Business School

3 Avenue Bernard Hirsch
B.P 50105
Cergy - Pontoise Cedex, NA 95021
France

University of Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA ( email )

33 boulevard du port
F-95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, 95011
France

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
92
rank
264,768
Abstract Views
611
PlumX Metrics