The Cost of Inexperience

46 Pages Posted: 2 Oct 2015 Last revised: 13 May 2017

See all articles by Mirit Eyal-Cohen

Mirit Eyal-Cohen

University of Alabama - School of Law; UC Berkeley, School of Law

Date Written: September 30, 2016


Free market entry is vital in preventing concentration of market power and eliminating large deadweight losses. Yet, in recent years, studies show that newcomers are less successful than existing firms that have diversifies their products in the market. What might explain this phenomenon?

This Article unveils a regulatory catch 22. It reveals that although a regulation may be efficient in correcting a certain market failure, its distributional effects may create another. It exposes the degree to which “economies of experience” in regulation create significant disadvantages to newcomers and provide substantial advantages to old-timers. Being well-versed in their marketplace, old-timers possess knowledge, familiarity, and influence over the rulemaking process. New or “green” entities entering regulated market or dealing with a new rule face proportionally larger costs to obtain regulatory insight. Consequently, an anomaly exists when government choice may de facto hamper innovation and survival of newcomers, the same goals it seeks to promote.

To remedy this inconsistency, the Article suggests ways to offset these distributional asymmetries through the use of information cooperatives, regulatory sandboxes, and compensatory mechanisms. These solutions offer policymakers greater regulatory efficiency without resorting to deregulation.

Keywords: Economies of Scope, Age, Increasing Returns, Taxation, Regulation, Compliance Costs, Economic Growth, Regulatory Exclusions, Small Business, SBA

Suggested Citation

Eyal-Cohen, Mirit, The Cost of Inexperience (September 30, 2016). U of Alabama Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2667618. Available at SSRN: or

Mirit Eyal-Cohen (Contact Author)

University of Alabama - School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 870382
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

UC Berkeley, School of Law ( email )

Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA
United States
(310) 936-0680 (Phone)

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