The Exclusionary Rule and Damages: An Economic Comparison of Private Remedies for Unconstitutional Police Conduct

Brigham Young University Law Review, Vol. 2000, P. 1443, 2000

Posted: 16 Apr 2001  

Jeffrey Standen

Willamette University - College of Law

Abstract

The Supreme Court has always assumed that the exclusionary rule represents the gold standard against which all other putative remedies for unconstitutional police conduct must be measured. This paper suggests that exclusion, examined along several dimensions borrowed from the more robust economic scholarship on civil remedies, does not appear to constitute a clearly superior device to deter constitutional harms in comparison to damages. The dimensions include allocative efficiency and the problem of externalities, game theory, and principal-agency theory. The paper concludes that a damages remedy might offer a more refined solution to the problem of constraining police behavior.

Note: This is a description of the article and not the actual abstract.

JEL Classification: K14, K41

Suggested Citation

Standen, Jeffrey, The Exclusionary Rule and Damages: An Economic Comparison of Private Remedies for Unconstitutional Police Conduct. Brigham Young University Law Review, Vol. 2000, P. 1443, 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=266765

Jeffrey A. Standen (Contact Author)

Willamette University - College of Law ( email )

245 Winter St. SE
Salem, OR 97301
United States
503-370-6497 (Phone)
503-370-6375 (Fax)

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