Real Effects of PCAOB International Inspections

The Accounting Review, Forthcoming

62 Pages Posted: 2 Oct 2015 Last revised: 10 Oct 2019

See all articles by Nemit Shroff

Nemit Shroff

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Date Written: October 10, 2017


This paper examines the effect of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) international inspection program on companies’ financing and investing decisions. Estimates from difference-in-differences regressions suggest that companies respond to their auditor receiving a ‘deficiency-free’ inspection report by issuing additional external capital amounting to 1.4% of assets and increasing investment by 0.5% of assets. These effects are larger for (i) financially constrained companies and (ii) companies located in countries where there is no audit regulator or the audit regulator does not conduct inspections. Further, the effect on financing decisions is stronger in countries with (i) low corruption, (ii) strong rule of law, and (iii) high regulatory quality. Descriptive evidence suggests that inspections increase the use of financial covenants in debt contracts, which is likely one of the mechanisms through which inspections generate real effects. This paper documents the value of PCAOB inspections in mitigating financing frictions for non-U.S. companies.

Keywords: investment, real effects, financing constraints, auditing, financial reporting, regulation

JEL Classification: D8, D25, G15, G31, G38, M4, M41, M42

Suggested Citation

Shroff, Nemit, Real Effects of PCAOB International Inspections (October 10, 2017). The Accounting Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: or

Nemit Shroff (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

100 Main St.
Cambridge, MA MA 02142
United States
6173240805 (Phone)


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