How Do CEOs See Their Roles? Management Philosophies and Styles in Family and Non-Family Firms

44 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2015

See all articles by William Mullins

William Mullins

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Antoinette Schoar

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: January 1, 2015

Abstract

Using a survey of 800 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in 22 emerging economies, we show that CEOs' management styles and philosophies vary with the ownership and governance structure of their firms. Founders and CEOs of firms with greater family involvement display a greater stakeholder focus and feel more accountable to employees and banks than to shareholders. They also have a more hierarchical management approach, and see their role as maintaining the status quo rather than bringing about change. In contrast, CEOs of non-family firms emphasize shareholder-value-maximization. Finally, firm-level variation in ownership is as important in explaining management philosophies as cross-country or industry-level differences.

Keywords: CEOs, founder, family firms, stakeholders, delegation

JEL Classification: G3, G32, J62, M5

Suggested Citation

Mullins, William and Schoar, Antoinette, How Do CEOs See Their Roles? Management Philosophies and Styles in Family and Non-Family Firms (January 1, 2015). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming; Robert H. Smith School Research Paper No. RHS 2668267. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2668267

William Mullins (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States

Antoinette Schoar

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

50 Memorial Drive, E52-447
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-3763 (Phone)
617-258-6855 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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