Tying Law and Policy: A Decision Theoretic Approach

101 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2001

See all articles by Keith N. Hylton

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University - School of Law

Michael A. Salinger

Boston University - Questrom School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2001


This paper offers a decision theoretic framework for analyzing tying law, and presents a critical assessment of post-Chicago tying theory. The decision theoretic framework takes into account the likelihood of judicial error in the application of rules and the costs of such error. We use the decision theoretic framework to assess the proper legal rules regarding tying and technological integration. Three general themes run throughout much of our analysis. First, the per se rule against tying simply has no economic foundation. Second, while the post-Chicago literature established the theoretical possibility of anticompetitive tying, one must know the frequency of anticompetitive tying to formulate a rational legal rule. Because beneficial tying is so pervasive, rules against tying could be harmful even with a small rate of "false convictions." Third, the most plausible post-Chicago theory of anticompetitive tying is based on the assumption that the tying and tied goods are complementary and that they are both susceptible to market power. However, the long-established principle that integrated complementary monopoly results in lower prices than independent complementary monopolies suggests that a policy biased toward independent complementary monopolies has the predictable consequence of reducing consumer welfare.

JEL Classification: K21, K42, L41, L43, O31

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N. and Salinger, Michael A., Tying Law and Policy: A Decision Theoretic Approach (April 2001). Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 01-04, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=267170 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.267170

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)

Boston University - School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
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617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)

Michael A. Salinger

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States
617-353-4408 (Phone)

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