Electoral Incentives, Term Limits and the Sustainability of Peace

23 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2015

See all articles by Paola Conconi

Paola Conconi

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Nicolas Sahuguet

HEC Montreal - Institute of Applied Economics

Maurizio Zanardi

Lancaster University - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 2015

Abstract

One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autocracies, almost never fight each other. We develop a theoretical model to examine the sustainability of international peace between democracies and autocracies, where the crucial difference between these two political regimes is whether or not policymakers are subject to periodic elections. We show that the fear of losing office can make it less tempting for democratic leaders to wage war against other countries. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can be re-elected, suggesting that democracies with term limits should be more conflict prone, particularly when the executive is serving the last possible term. These results rationalize recent empirical findings on how term limits affect the propensity of democracies to engage in conflicts.

Keywords: Democratic Peace, Elections, Interstate Conflicts, Term Limits.

JEL Classification: C72, D72, F00

Suggested Citation

Conconi, Paola and Sahuguet, Nicolas and Zanardi, Maurizio, Electoral Incentives, Term Limits and the Sustainability of Peace (October 2015). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10873, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2673625

Paola Conconi (Contact Author)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
32 2 650 2345 (Phone)
32 2 650 4475 (Fax)

Nicolas Sahuguet

HEC Montreal - Institute of Applied Economics ( email )

3000, ch. de la Côte-Ste-Catherine
Montréal, Quebec H3T 2A7
Canada

Maurizio Zanardi

Lancaster University - Department of Economics ( email )

Lancaster LA1 4YX, LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/staff/zanardi/

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