If the Worst Comes to the Worst. Dictator Giving When Recipient's Endowments are Risky

46 Pages Posted: 14 Oct 2015

See all articles by Christoph Engel

Christoph Engel

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, Students; Universität Osnabrück - Faculty of Law

Sebastian J. Goerg

Florida State University - Department of Economics; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Date Written: October 2015

Abstract

Donors may often not be sure whether a recipient really deserves their help. Does this uncertainty deter generosity? In an experiment we find that, to the contrary, under most specifications of uncertainty, dictators give more, compared with the donation the same dictator makes to a recipient they know to have the expected value of the endowment with certainty. They are particularly concerned about the possibility that a recipient leaves the lab with no payoff from the game.

Keywords: Donation, Dictator Game, Uncertainty

JEL Classification: C91, D03, D81

Suggested Citation

Engel, Christoph and Goerg, Sebastian J., If the Worst Comes to the Worst. Dictator Giving When Recipient's Endowments are Risky (October 2015). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2015/15. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2674047 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2674047

Christoph Engel (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
+049 228 914160 (Phone)
+049 228 9141655 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/engel.html

University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics

Postfach 2220
D-53012 Bonn
Germany

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, Students ( email )

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
PO Box 1738
Rotterdam
Netherlands

Universität Osnabrück - Faculty of Law

Osnabruck, D-49069
Germany

Sebastian J. Goerg

Florida State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Tallahassee, FL 30306-2180
United States
+1 (850) 644-7083 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.s-goerg.de

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de

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