Insuring Your Donation – An Experiment

33 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 2015 Last revised: 7 Jun 2016

See all articles by Renate Buijze

Renate Buijze

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Law, Students

Christoph Engel

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, Students; Universität Osnabrück - Faculty of Law

Sigrid Hemels

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law; Lund University School of Economics and Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 1, 2015

Abstract

An increasing fraction of donations is channeled through donation intermediaries. These entities serve multiple purposes, one of which seems to be providing donors with greater certainty: that the donation reaches its intended goal, and that the donor may be sure to get a tax benefit. We interpret this function as insurance and test the option to insure donations in the lab. Our participants indeed have a positive willingness to pay for insurance against either risk. Yet the insurance option is only critical for their willingness to donate to a charity if the uncertainty affects the proper use of their donation.

Keywords: Insurance, charity, Donation, donation intermediary

JEL Classification: D64, H25, D03, H31, D12, G22, K34, L31

Suggested Citation

Buijze, Renate and Engel, Christoph and Hemels, Sigrid, Insuring Your Donation – An Experiment (October 1, 2015). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2015/16. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2674553 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2674553

Renate Buijze

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Law, Students ( email )

Netherlands

Christoph Engel (Contact Author)

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
+049 228 914160 (Phone)
+049 228 9141655 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/engel.html

University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics

Postfach 2220
D-53012 Bonn
Germany

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, Students ( email )

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
PO Box 1738
Rotterdam
Netherlands

Universität Osnabrück - Faculty of Law

Osnabruck, D-49069
Germany

Sigrid Hemels

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.esl.eur.nl/profile/profiel_metis/1112068

Lund University School of Economics and Management ( email )

Lund

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