Underestimated Strategies Beneath Candidate Donald Trump’s Presidential Campaign

11 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2015 Last revised: 19 Mar 2016

See all articles by Frank T. Manheim

Frank T. Manheim

Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University

Date Written: October 15, 2015

Abstract

Until recently most political columnists predicted that Donald J. Trump, billionaire real estate developer and TV personality, would fade as a Republican candidate in the 2016 Presidential campaign. Nevertheless, he has continued to rise in the polls. In a speech at the October 12, 2015 “No Labels Problem Solver Convention” Trump revealed examples of his “dealmaking” in public service applications.

Successful dealmaking means concluding mutually acceptable agreements with others, including opponents - the opposite of the gridlock that has inhibited the federal government’s ability to solve critical national issues. Analysis of Trump’s speeches and books suggests that underrated operating strategies and assets lie beneath his exhibitionistic and controversial campaign tactics. This study concludes that barring unexpected developments he is likely to maintain his lead in the polls and win the Republican nomination. However, he would encounter greater challenges in the presidential campaign. Assessment of Trump’s eight negotiation principles opens up the interesting question of how he would apply them to the U.S.’s paralyzing political polarization.

Keywords: Donald Trump, Republican primary, political polarization, dealmaking, flamboyant, No Labels organization

JEL Classification: C78, D73, D74, H32, J52, L32, L73, O17, P12, Z00

Suggested Citation

Manheim, Frank T., Underestimated Strategies Beneath Candidate Donald Trump’s Presidential Campaign (October 15, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2674826 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2674826

Frank T. Manheim (Contact Author)

Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University ( email )

Founders Hall
3351 Fairfax Dr.
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
7036310166 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://policy.gmu.edu/manheim

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