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Competing for Refugees: A Market-Based Solution to a Humanitarian Crisis

60 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2015 Last revised: 8 Sep 2017

Joseph Blocher

Duke University School of Law

G. Mitu Gulati

Duke University School of Law

Date Written: August 14, 2016

Abstract

The unprecedented scale of the modern refugee crisis demands novel legal solutions, and new ways of summing the political will to implement them. As a matter of national incentives, the goal must be to design mechanisms that discourage countries of origin from creating refugees, and encourage host countries to welcome them. One way to achieve this would be to recognize that persecuted refugee groups have a financial claim against their countries of origin, and that this claim can be traded to host nations in exchange for acceptance. Modifications to the international apparatus would be necessary, but the basic legal elements of this proposal already exist. In short, international law can and should give refugees a legal asset, give host nations incentives to accept them, and give oppressive countries of origin the bill.

Keywords: refugees, international law, sovereignty, burden-sharing

Suggested Citation

Blocher, Joseph and Gulati, G. Mitu, Competing for Refugees: A Market-Based Solution to a Humanitarian Crisis (August 14, 2016). Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Forthcoming; Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2015-48. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2674831

Joseph Blocher (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

Gaurang Mitu Gulati

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

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