Experience and Gender Effects in an Acquiring-a-Company Experiment Allowing for Value Messages

43 Pages Posted: 16 Oct 2015

See all articles by Daniela Di Cagno

Daniela Di Cagno

LUISS, Rome

Arianna Galliera

Politecnico di Milano

Werner Guth

Max Planck Institute of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Noemi Pace

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics

Luca Panaccione

University of Rome Tor Vergata

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 16, 2015

Abstract

This paper focuses on a bargaining experiment in which the privately informed seller of a company sends a value message to the uninformed potential buyer who then proposes a price for acquiring the company. Participants are constantly in the role of either seller or buyer and interact over 30 rounds with randomly changing partners in the other role. We test how overstating the value of the company, underpricing the received value message and acceptance of price offers are affected by experience and gender (constellation). Like in our companion paper on single play (Di Cagno et al. 2015) we control via treatments for awareness of gender (constellation). One main hypothesis is that gender (constellation) matters but that the effects become weaker with more experience and that the main experience effects apply across gender (constellations).

Keywords: bargaining, cheap-talk, experience effect, experiment, gender, winner’s curse

JEL Classification: C78, C91

Suggested Citation

Di Cagno, Daniela and Galliera, Arianna and Güth, Werner and Pace, Noemi and Panaccione, Luca, Experience and Gender Effects in an Acquiring-a-Company Experiment Allowing for Value Messages (October 16, 2015). University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 30/WP/2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2675087 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2675087

Daniela Di Cagno

LUISS, Rome ( email )

00162 Rome, Roma
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.luiss.it/facolta/insegnamenti/curriculu

Arianna Galliera

Politecnico di Milano ( email )

Milan
Italy

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute of Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Noemi Pace (Contact Author)

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy

Luca Panaccione

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

via Columbia 2
Rome, IA Rome 00133
Italy

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