Private Safety-Net Clinics: Effects of Financial Pressures and Community Characteristics on Closures

26 Pages Posted: 19 Oct 2015 Last revised: 24 Feb 2025

See all articles by Suhui Li

Suhui Li

George Washington University

Avi Dor

Case Western Reserve University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jesse Pines

George Washington University

Mark Zocchi

George Washington University

Renee Hsia

University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) - San Francisco General Hospital

Date Written: October 2015

Abstract

In order to better understand what threatens vulnerable populations’ access to primary care, it is important to understand the factors associated with closing safety-net clinics. This paper examines how a clinic’s financial position, productivity, and community characteristics are associated with its risk of closure. We examine patterns of closures among private-run primary care clinics (PCCs) in California between 2006 and 2012. We use a discrete-time proportional hazard model to assess relative hazard ratios of covariates, and a random-effect hazard model to adjust for unobserved heterogeneity among PCCs. We find that lower net income from patient care, smaller amount of government grants, and lower productivity were associated with significantly higher risk of PCC closure. We also find that federally qualified health centers (FQHCs) and non-FQHCs generally faced the same risk factors of closure. These results underscore the critical role of financial incentives in the long-term viability of safety-net clinics.

Suggested Citation

Li, Suhui and Dor, Avi and Pines, Jesse and Zocchi, Mark and Hsia, Renee, Private Safety-Net Clinics: Effects of Financial Pressures and Community Characteristics on Closures (October 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w21648, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2675921

Suhui Li (Contact Author)

George Washington University ( email )

950 New Hampshire Ave.
Washington, DC 20052
United States

Avi Dor

Case Western Reserve University - Department of Economics ( email )

Cleveland, OH 44106
United States
216-368-4110 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Jesse Pines

George Washington University ( email )

2121 I Street NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States

Mark Zocchi

George Washington University ( email )

2121 I Street NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States

Renee Hsia

University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) - San Francisco General Hospital ( email )

1001 Potrero Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94110
United States

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