Market Structure and the Environmental Implications of Trade Liberalization: Russia's Accession to the World Trade Organization

27 Pages Posted: 21 Oct 2015

See all articles by Christoph Böhringer

Christoph Böhringer

University of Oldenburg

Thomas Rutherford

University of Wisconsin - Madison

David G. Tarr

International Trade Analysis

Natalia Turdyeva

Bank of Russia

Date Written: November 2015

Abstract

We investigate the environmental impacts of Russia's World Trade Organization (WTO) accession with a computable general equilibrium model incorporating imperfectly competitive firms, foreign direct investment and endogenous productivity. WTO accession increases CO emissions through technique (−), composition (+) and scale (+) effects. We consider three complementary policies to limit CO emissions: cap and trade, emission intensity standards and energy efficiency standards. With imperfectly competitive firms, gains from WTO accession result with any of these policies. If we assume perfectly competitive market structures, the negative environmental impacts of WTO accession are smaller and no net gains arise when environmental regulation involves energy intensity or efficiency standards.

Suggested Citation

Böhringer, Christoph and Rutherford, Thomas and Tarr, David G. and Turdyeva, Natalia, Market Structure and the Environmental Implications of Trade Liberalization: Russia's Accession to the World Trade Organization (November 2015). Review of International Economics, Vol. 23, Issue 5, pp. 897-923, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2676977 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/roie.12197

Christoph Böhringer (Contact Author)

University of Oldenburg

Ammerländer Heerstraße 114-118
Oldenburg, D-26111
Germany

Thomas Rutherford

University of Wisconsin - Madison ( email )

David G. Tarr

International Trade Analysis ( email )

7901 Hispanola Avenue
Apt. 1102
North Bay Village, FL 33141
United States
5712242796 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/davidgtarr/

Natalia Turdyeva

Bank of Russia ( email )

12 Neglinnaya Street
Moscow, 107016
Russia

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