The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
26 Pages Posted: 2 May 2001
Date Written: November 16, 2000
We describe the maximum efficient subgame perfect equiligrium payoff for a player in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, as a function of the discount factor. For discount factors above a critical level, every efficient, feasible, individually rational payoff profile can be sustained. For an open and dense subset of discount factors below the critical value, the maximum efficient payoff is not an equilibrium payoff. When a player cannot achieve this payoff, the unique equilibrium outcome achieving the best efficient equilibrium payoff for a player is eventually cyclic. There is an uncountable number of discount factors below the critical level such that the maximum efficient payoff is an equilibrium payoff.
Keywords: Equilibrium Payoffs, Perfect Monitoring
JEL Classification: C72, C73
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