Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of an Economy with Incomplete Information
26 Pages Posted: 2 May 2001
Date Written: January 3, 2001
Abstract
We examine the ex ante incentive compatible core, and show that generically, when agents are informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (1999), the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty.
Keywords: core, incentive compatibility, general equilibrium, asymmetric information
JEL Classification: D5, D7
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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