Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

21 Pages Posted: 2 May 2001

See all articles by George J. Mailath

George J. Mailath

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Research School of Economics, ANU

Steven A. Matthews

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Tadashi Sekiguchi

Kobe University; Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research

Date Written: March 5, 2001

Abstract

We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more familiar perfect public equilibria: (i) making a public signal less informative can create Pareto superior equilibrium outcomes; (ii) the equilibrium final-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium; and (iii) even if the stage game has a unique correlated (and hence Nash) equilibrium, the first-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium.

Keywords: Private strategies, repeated games, public perfect equilibria

JEL Classification: C72, C73

Suggested Citation

Mailath, George J. and Matthews, Steven A. and Sekiguchi, Tadashi and Sekiguchi, Tadashi, Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (March 5, 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=267787 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.267787

George J. Mailath (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7908 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://web.sas.upenn.edu/gmailath/

Research School of Economics, ANU ( email )

HW Arndt Building
College of Business and Economics
Canberra, ACT 2601
Australia

Steven A. Matthews

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7749 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~stevenma

Tadashi Sekiguchi

Kobe University ( email )

2-1, Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku
Kobe, 657-8501, 657-8501
Japan

Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research ( email )

Yoshida-Honmachi
Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8501
Japan

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