Caesarean Section and the Manipulation of Exact Delivery Time

Quaderni Working Paper DSE No. 1036

31 Pages Posted: 26 Oct 2015

See all articles by Daniele Fabbri

Daniele Fabbri

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Chiara Monfardini

University of Bologna - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Ilaria Castaldini

Local Health Authority of Bologna (Italy)

Adalgisa Protonotari

Local Health Authority of Bologna (Italy)

Date Written: October 23, 2015

Abstract

Physicians are often alleged responsible for the manipulation of delivery timing. We investigate this issue in a setting that negates the influence of financial incentives behind “physician’s demand induction” but allows for “risk aversion” to medical errors and “demand for leisure” motivations. Working on a sample of women admitted at the onset of labor in a big public hospital in Italy we estimate a model for the exact time of delivery as driven by individual indication to receive Caesarean Section (CS) and covariates. We find that ICS does not affect the day of delivery but leads to a circadian rhythm in the likelihood of delivery. The pattern is consistent with the postponement of high ICS deliveries in the late night\early morning shift. Our evidence hardly supports the manipulation of timing of births as driven by medical staff’s “demand for leisure”. An explanation based on “risk aversion” attitude seems more appropriate.

Keywords: timing of delivery, physician incentives, caesarean section, scheduling

JEL Classification: I11, L23, C35, C51

Suggested Citation

Fabbri, Daniele and Monfardini, Chiara and Castaldini, Ilaria and Protonotari, Adalgisa, Caesarean Section and the Manipulation of Exact Delivery Time (October 23, 2015). Quaderni Working Paper DSE No. 1036, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2678874 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2678874

Daniele Fabbri (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40126
Italy

Chiara Monfardini

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40126
Italy
0039 51 2098148 (Phone)
0039 51 221968 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Ilaria Castaldini

Local Health Authority of Bologna (Italy) ( email )

Education and graduate training unit
Via Sant'Isaia 94/a
Bologna, Bologna 40123
Italy

Adalgisa Protonotari

Local Health Authority of Bologna (Italy) ( email )

Education and graduate training unit
Via Sant'Isaia 94/a
Bologna, Bologna 40123
Italy

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