Computer Hacking and Securities Fraud

47 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1985 (October 19, 2015)

Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 26

7 Pages Posted: 20 Feb 2016 Last revised: 13 Jun 2016

See all articles by Andrew N. Vollmer

Andrew N. Vollmer

Mercatus Center at George Mason University

Date Written: September 24, 2015

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to consider the strength of securities fraud charges asserted against computer hackers who used technical methods to obtain unauthorized access to corporate press releases before they were released to the public and traders who paid for the stolen information and used it to buy and sell securities. On the assumption that the factual allegations in charging documents are true, the defendants engaged in serious misconduct, but did they commit insider trading or securities fraud? The paper uses a leading authority from the Second Circuit to show that an insider trading theory would nearly certainly fail. The general securities fraud charges against the hackers and traders are also weak. The government must prove that the hackers and traders committed a deception and that the deception was “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a security. Based on the allegations, the hackers probably used deception, but the factual basis for the “in connection with” element is novel. The traders bought and sold securities but engaged in no deceit at all.

Keywords: computer hacking, Rule 10b-5, deception requirement, in connection with requirement

Suggested Citation

Vollmer, Andrew N., Computer Hacking and Securities Fraud (September 24, 2015). 47 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1985 (October 19, 2015), Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 26, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2679092

Andrew N. Vollmer (Contact Author)

Mercatus Center at George Mason University ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
178
Abstract Views
1,164
rank
205,113
PlumX Metrics