Legislative Scrutiny? The Political Economy and Practice of Legislative Vetoes in the European Union

17 Pages Posted: 26 Oct 2015

See all articles by Michael Kaeding

Michael Kaeding

University of Duisburg-Essen - Institute of Political Science

Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt University - Law School

Date Written: November 2015

Abstract

This article examines the European Parliament's and Council of Ministers' use of legislative vetoes to override the European Commission's rule‐making. Well‐established principles of political economy suggest that the Parliament and Council will exercise their veto powers infrequently. Using an original data set of legislative vetoes of Commission acts by both European legislators from June 2006 to April 2014, we show that levels of formal exercise of the legislative veto to overrule the Commission's regulatory policies are indeed very low. Particularly interesting is the fact that the level of exercise of legislative veto provisions has not increased significantly since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, suggesting that the ways in which the Treaty formally augmented the powers of legislative scrutiny have not resulted in appreciably greater formal exercise of these powers. Moreover, no significant differences appear between the two European Union legislative bodies.

Keywords: european parliament, council of minister, legislative veto, delegated act, regulatory procedure with scrutiny

Suggested Citation

Kaeding, Michael and Stack, Kevin M., Legislative Scrutiny? The Political Economy and Practice of Legislative Vetoes in the European Union (November 2015). JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 53, Issue 6, pp. 1268-1284, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2679144 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12252

Michael Kaeding (Contact Author)

University of Duisburg-Essen - Institute of Political Science ( email )

Lotharstrasse 65
Duisburg, D-47057
Germany

Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

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