Political Hazards and Firms’ Geographic Concentration
Forthcoming in Strategic Management Journal
47 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2015
Date Written: October 26, 2015
We examine the relationship between the geographic concentration of a firm’s sales and the firm’s vulnerability to expropriation hazards. Although expanding outside the home location can initially increase a firm’s exposure to government expropriation, we find that this effect reverses when a firm’s sales outside its home location have reached a point at which it has sufficient resources to better influence government actions and to pose a credible threat to exit the market in which it is being targeted. We supplement this main result by identifying two moderating factors: the firm’s level of political capital and the effectiveness of institutional constraints on government behavior. We find support for these hypotheses from survey data on privately owned enterprises in China.
Keywords: Political hazards, geographic concentration, state incentives, mobility, China
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