Local Favoritism in At-Large Proportional Representation Systems

44 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2015

See all articles by Jon H. Fiva

Jon H. Fiva

Norwegian School of Management (BI) - Department of Economics

Askill Harkjerr Halse

University of Oslo; Institute of Transport Economics

Date Written: September 30, 2015

Abstract

Pork barrel spending is typically attributed to the strategic behavior of political elites hoping to be electorally rewarded by voters residing in their districts. Such behavior is expected to depend on the incentives imposed by the electoral system. We estimate the causal effect of local representation in a closed list proportional representation system where individual candidates have no clear electoral incentive to favor their hometown. Using data from Norwegian regional governments, we still find a hometown bias. We document that municipalities with a representative on the regional council from the same party as the governor tend to obtain more funding for local investments. In an extension we show that citizens also tend to vote more often for parties with a governor candidate from their own hometown, consistent with an expectation of particularistic benefits. Both effects are driven by municipalities with below median population size.

Keywords: distributive politics, voting behavior, regression discontinuity design

JEL Classification: D720, H720, H770

Suggested Citation

Fiva, Jon H. and Halse, Askill Harkjerr, Local Favoritism in At-Large Proportional Representation Systems (September 30, 2015). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5534. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2681049

Jon H. Fiva (Contact Author)

Norwegian School of Management (BI) - Department of Economics ( email )

Oslo
Norway

Askill Harkjerr Halse

University of Oslo ( email )

PO Box 6706 St Olavs plass
Oslo, N-0317
Norway

Institute of Transport Economics ( email )

NO-0349
Oslo
Norway

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