The Juncker Commission's Better Regulation Agenda and its Impact on National Parliaments

in EUI Working Paper MWP 2015/18, Special Issue ‘Parliaments, Public Opinion and Parliamentary Elections in Europe’, ed. by Cristina Fasone et al., 2015, pp. 45-54.

17 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2015

See all articles by Davor Jancic

Davor Jancic

Queen Mary University of London

Date Written: October 29, 2015

Abstract

This paper analyses the Commission's 2015 Better Regulation package with a view to determining its implications for NPs’ prerogatives in EU policy making. The examination begins with the argument that the legal basis for including NPs in better regulation exists in the Treaties. The paper continues with a brief overview of the evolution of better regulation in the EU. This will pave the way for a discussion of the Juncker Commission’s Better Regulation Agenda, which consists of a package of reforms laid out in a Communication and implemented through a new set of Guidelines, a refurbished Toolbox for practitioners, a revised Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT), and a Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Regulation. Finally, the paper concludes that the Better Regulation Agenda maintains the status quo in the NPs’ participation in EU affairs and misses the opportunity to fortify their European embeddedness.

Keywords: Juncker Commission, Better Regulation Agenda, national parliaments, EU policy making, REFIT

Suggested Citation

Jancic, Davor, The Juncker Commission's Better Regulation Agenda and its Impact on National Parliaments (October 29, 2015). in EUI Working Paper MWP 2015/18, Special Issue ‘Parliaments, Public Opinion and Parliamentary Elections in Europe’, ed. by Cristina Fasone et al., 2015, pp. 45-54.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2683358

Davor Jancic (Contact Author)

Queen Mary University of London ( email )

Mile End Road
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London, E1 4NS
United Kingdom
+442078823166 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk/staff/jancic.html

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