Sustained Cooperation by Running Away from Bad Behavior

30 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2015

See all articles by Charles Efferson

Charles Efferson

Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne

Carlos Roca

Babraham Institute

Sonja Vogt

ETH Zürich

Dirk Helbing

ETH Zürich - Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences (GESS)

Date Written: October 29, 2015

Abstract

For cooperation to evolve, some mechanism must limit the rate at which cooperators are exposed to defectors. Only then can the advantages of mutual cooperation outweigh the costs of being exploited. Although researchers widely agree on this, they disagree intensely about which evolutionary mechanisms can explain the extraordinary cooperation exhibited by humans. Much of the controversy follows from disagreements about the informational regularity that allows cooperators to avoid defectors. Reliable information can allow cooperative individuals to avoid exploitation, but which mechanisms can sustain such a situation is a matter of considerable dispute. We conducted a behavioral experiment to see if cooperators could avoid defectors when provided with limited amounts of explicit information. We gave each participant the simple option to move away from her current neighborhood at any time. Participants were not identifiable as individuals, and they could not track each other’s tendency to behave more or less cooperatively. More broadly, a participant had no information about the behavior she was likely to encounter if she moved, and so information about the risk of exploitation was extremely limited. Nonetheless, our results show that simply providing the option to move allowed cooperation to persist for a long period of time. Our results further show that movement, even though it involved considerable uncertainty, allowed would-be cooperators to assort positively and eliminate on average any individual payoff disadvantage associated with cooperation. This suggests that choosing to move, even under limited information, can completely reorganize the mix of selective forces relevant for the evolution of cooperation.

Keywords: evolution of cooperation, positive assortment, migration, behavioral experiment

Suggested Citation

Efferson, Charles and Roca, Carlos and Vogt, Sonja and Helbing, Dirk, Sustained Cooperation by Running Away from Bad Behavior (October 29, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2683408 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2683408

Charles Efferson (Contact Author)

Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne ( email )

Lausanne, CH-1015
Switzerland

Carlos Roca

Babraham Institute

Babraham Research Campus
Cambridge, CB3 1AB
United Kingdom

Sonja Vogt

ETH Zürich ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
8092 Zurich, CH-1015
Switzerland

Dirk Helbing

ETH Zürich - Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences (GESS) ( email )

ETH Zurich - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
Clausiusstrasse 50
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.coss.ethz.ch

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
15
Abstract Views
772
PlumX Metrics