Internet Appendix for 'The Effect of CEO Departure on Target Firms’ Post-Takeover Performance: Evidence from Not-Delisting Target Firms'

7 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2015

Date Written: October 30, 2015

Abstract

This internet appendix provides additional results that complement the main results of the paper. In the first part, we show the results of the self-selection model that incorporates the observation that target firms may self-select not to delist from the stock markets after takeovers. In the second part, we employ a propensity score matching model to address the potential endogeneity between CEO turnover and subsequent firm performance.

The paper "The Effect of CEO Departure on Target Firms’ Post-Takeover Performance: Evidence from Not-Delisting Target Firms" to which these Appendices apply is available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2684064

Keywords: Corporate takeover, Acquisition performance, CEO turnover

JEL Classification: G14, G30, G34, M12

Suggested Citation

Demirtas, Gul and Simsir, Serif Aziz, Internet Appendix for 'The Effect of CEO Departure on Target Firms’ Post-Takeover Performance: Evidence from Not-Delisting Target Firms' (October 30, 2015). Finance Research Letters, Forthcoming , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2684050

Gul Demirtas

Sabanci University ( email )

School of Management
Orhanli Tuzla
İstanbul, 34956
Turkey

Serif Aziz Simsir (Contact Author)

Sabanci University ( email )

Sabanci Business School
Istanbul, Orhanli, 34956 Tuzla
Turkey

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