The Influence of Family Firm Dynamics on Voluntary Disclosures

40 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2015

See all articles by Joanna Golden

Joanna Golden

University of Memphis - School of Accountancy

Mark J. Kohlbeck

Florida Atlantic University - School of Accounting

Date Written: August 27, 2015

Abstract

We examine the voluntary disclosure practices of family firms. Family firms have longer investment horizons, lower agency conflicts between owners and managers but higher agency conflicts between controlling and non-controlling shareholders, and greater concerns about firm reputation. We therefore hypothesize that the previously documented association between stock-based incentives and voluntary disclosures is dampened for family firms. We find that, compared to non-family firms, family firms are less likely to provide management earnings forecasts as their CEO’s wealth linked to the firm increases. We further find that this influence is only present in larger firms consistent with larger firms have significantly greater stock-based incentives than smaller firms. We contribute to the literature by extending stock-based incentive and voluntary disclosure research, link this research to family firms, and provide insight on conflicting results investigating family firms.

Keywords: family firms, voluntary disclosure, management forecasts, stock-based incentives

JEL Classification: M41

Suggested Citation

Golden, Joanna and Kohlbeck, Mark J., The Influence of Family Firm Dynamics on Voluntary Disclosures (August 27, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2684104 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2684104

Joanna Golden

University of Memphis - School of Accountancy ( email )

223 Fogelman College Admin. Bldg.
Memphis, TN 38152
United States

Mark J. Kohlbeck (Contact Author)

Florida Atlantic University - School of Accounting ( email )

777 Glades Avenue
KH 119
Boca Raton, FL 33431-0991
United States
561-297-1363 (Phone)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
86
Abstract Views
1,345
rank
306,837
PlumX Metrics