Security Choice and the Announcement Effect

29 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2015 Last revised: 4 Oct 2018

See all articles by Tore E. Leite

Tore E. Leite

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)

Date Written: April 11, 2018

Abstract

This paper analyzes the choice between debt and equity under ex-ante asymmetric information and zero bankruptcy costs and how this choice depends on the relative announcement effects for debt and equity offerings. A novel implication of the model is that firms prefer the security with the least negative announcement effect, which may be debt or equity depending on parameter values. Nonetheless, the model implies that, in equilibrium, debt offerings will be associated with less negative (to zero) announcement returns compared to equity offerings. Finally, the model predicts riskier (less risky) investment opportunities to be financed with equity (debt).

Keywords: Capital raising, Asymmetric Information, Announcement Returns, Debt, Equity, Undervinvestment

JEL Classification: G30, G32

Suggested Citation

Leite, Tore E., Security Choice and the Announcement Effect (April 11, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2685632 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2685632

Tore E. Leite (Contact Author)

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5045 Bergen
Norway
+47 5595 9343 (Phone)
+47 5595 9841 (Fax)

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