Institutional Investors and Corporate Political Activism

53 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2015

See all articles by Rui A. Albuquerque

Rui A. Albuquerque

Boston College, Carroll School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Zicheng Lei

King's College London

Jörg Rocholl

ESMT European School of Management and Technology; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Chendi Zhang

University of Exeter Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2015

Abstract

The landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission asserts for the first time that corporations benefit from First Amendment protection regarding freedom of speech in the form of independent political expenditures, thus creating a new avenue for political activism. This paper studies how corporations adjusted their political activism in response to this ruling. The paper presents evidence consistent with the hypothesis that institutional investors have a preference for not using the new avenue for political activism, a preference not shared by other investors.

Keywords: Citizens United, Corporate Governance, Institutional Investors, Political Activism

JEL Classification: G23, G30

Suggested Citation

Albuquerque, Rui A. and Lei, Zicheng and Rocholl, Joerg and Zhang, Chendi, Institutional Investors and Corporate Political Activism (November 2015). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10916, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2685673

Rui A. Albuquerque (Contact Author)

Boston College, Carroll School of Management ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3808
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/ruialbuquerque/home

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Zicheng Lei

King's College London ( email )

Bush House
30 Aldwych, Strand
London, WC2B 4BG
United Kingdom

Joerg Rocholl

ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.esmt.org/en/159244

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Chendi Zhang

University of Exeter Business School ( email )

Streatham Court
Xfi Building, Rennes Dr.
Exeter, EX4 4JH
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
548
PlumX Metrics