Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate Law
90 Pages Posted: 7 Nov 2015 Last revised: 30 May 2019
Date Written: April 15, 2019
This article develops an empirical model of firms’ choice of corporate laws under inertia. Delaware dominates the incorporation market, though recently Nevada, a state whose laws are highly protective of managers, has acquired a sizable market share. Using a database of firm incorporation decisions from 1995-2013, we show that most firms dislike protectionist laws, such as anti-takeover statutes and liability protections for officers, and that Nevada’s rise is due to the preferences of small firms. Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, our estimates indicate that despite inertia, Delaware would lose significant market share and revenues if it adopted protectionist laws.
Keywords: Regulatory Competition, Corporate Governance, Anti-Takeover Statutes, Directors and Officers Liability, Delaware, Nevada, Discrete Choice Models, Inertia
JEL Classification: G34, K22, L00, G28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation